Angry in the Great White North

From Taking Life: Humans, by Peter Singer, professor at Princeton University, failed Green Party candidate in Australia in 1996, defender of bestiality, and required reading for PETA members:

Given these facts, suppose that a newborn baby is diagnosed as a haemophiliac. The parents, daunted by the prospect of bringing up a child with this condition, are not anxious for him to live. Could euthanasia be defended here? Our first reaction may well be a firm 'no', for the infant can be expected to have a life that is worth living, even if not quite as good as that of a normal baby. The 'prior existence' version of utilitarianism supports this judgment. The infant exists. His life can be expected to contain a positive balance of happiness over misery. To kill him would deprive him of this positive balance of happiness. Therefore it would be wrong.

On the 'total' version of utilitarianism, however, we cannot reach a decision on the basis of this information alone. The total view makes it necessary to ask whether the death of the haemophiliac infant would lead to the creation of another being who would not otherwise have existed. In other words, if the haemophiliac child is killed, will his parents have another child whom they would not have if the haemophiliac child lives? If they would, is the second child likely to have a better life than the one killed?

Often it will be possible to answer both these questions affinnatively. A woman may plan to have two children. If one dies while she is of child-bearing age, she may conceive another in its place. Suppose a woman planning to have two children has one normal child, and then gives birth to a haemophiliac child. The burden of caring for that child may make it impossible for her to cope with a third child; but if the disabled child were to die, she would have another. It is also plausible to suppose that the prospects of a happy life are better for a normal child than for a haemophiliac.

When the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed. The loss of happy life for the first infant is outweighed by the gain of a happier life for the second. Therefore, if killing the haemophiliac infant has no adverse effect on others, it would, according to the total view, be right to kill him.

The total view treats infants as replaceable, in much the same way as it treats non-self-conscious animals (as we saw in Chapter 5). Many will think that the replaceability argument cannot be applied to human infants. The direct killing of even the most hopelessly disabled infant is still officially regarded as murder; how then could the killing of infants with far less serious problems, like haemophilia, be accepted? Yet on further reflection, the implications of the replaceability argument do not seem quite so bizarre. For there are disabled members of our species whom we now deal with exactly as the argument suggests we should. These cases closely resemble the ones we have been discussing. There is only one difference, and that is a difference of timing - the timing of the discovery of the problem, and the consequent killing of the disabled being.

OK, to summarize:

• we have the wisdom to determine the future "balance of happiness" of a person


• that "balance" includes what burden he puts on others (I faced the possibility of my daughter being afflicted with cerebral palsy -- the doctors are now certain she does not have that condition or any other condition -- but never thought to achieve balance by killing her)


• that "balance" includes what a better life might occur for the next child who is born without the affliction, who would not have been born had you not killed the hemophiliac (well, you might actually have to kill several babies in a row if the hemophilia manifests in each one, and by the way, bruising on my newborn son Simon's legs made the doctors consider if he had a clotting disorder -- he does not -- thank goodness Peter Singer wasn't nearby)


• infants on non-self-conscious, so they are replaceable (presumably any infant without memories or life experience is interchangeable with any other)

Prenatal diagnosis of medical conditions often leads to abortions. He argues that this principle should be carried forward to as a test of non-self-conscious infants (note to parents: go back to when you first held your "non-self-conscious" baby, and think about Peter Singer casting his utilitarian eye on your baby's "balance of happiness", and think about failing his test).

Prenatal diagnosis, followed by abortion in selected cases, is common practice in countries with liberal abortion laws and advanced medical techniques. I think this is as it should be. As the arguments of Chapter 6 indicate, I believe that abortion can be justified. Note, however, that neither haemophilia nor Down's syndrome is so crippling as to make life not worth living, from the inner perspective of the person with the condition. To abort a fetus with one of these disabilities, intending to have another child who will not be disabled, is to treat fetuses as interchangeable or replaceable. If the mother has previously decided to have a certain number of children, say two, then what she is doing, in effect, is rejecting one potential child in favour of another. She could, in defence of her actions, say: the loss of life of the aborted fetus is outweighed by the gain of a better life for the normal child who will be conceived only if the disabled one dies.

When death occurs before birth, replaceability does not conflict with generally accepted moral convictions. That a fetus is known to be disabled is widely accepted as a ground for abortion. Yet in discussing abortion, we saw that birth does not mark a morally significant dividing line. I cannot see how one could defend the view that fetuses may be 'replaced' before birth, but newborn infants may not be. Nor is there any other point, such as viability, that does a better job of dividing the fetus from the infant. Self-consciousness, which could provide a basis for holding that it is wrong to kill one being and replace it with another, is not to be found in either the fetus or the newborn infant. Neither the fetus nor the newborn infant is an individual capable of regarding itself as a distinct entity with a life of its own to lead, and it is only for newborn infants, or for still earlier stages of human life, that replaceability should be considered to be an ethically acceptable option.

In any case, the position taken here does not imply that it would be better that no people born with severe disabilities should survive; it implies only that the parents of such infants should be able to make this decision. Nor does this imply lack of respect or equal consideration for people with disabilities who are now living their own lives in accordance with their own wishes. As we saw at the end of Chapter 2, the principle of equal consideration of interests rejects any discounting of the interests of people on grounds of disability.

Regarding newborn infants as replaceable, as we now regard fetuses, would have considerable advantages over prenatal diagnosis followed by abortion. Prenatal diagnosis still cannot detect all major disabilities. Some disabilities, in fact, are not present before birth; they may be the result of extremely pre- mature birth, or of something going wrong in the birth process itself. At present parents can choose to keep or destroy their disabled offspring only if the disability happens to be detected during pregnancy. There is no logical basis for restricting parents' choice to these particular disabilities. If disabled newborn infants were not regarded as having a right to life until, say, a week or a month after birth it would allow parents, in consultation with their doctors, to choose on the basis of far greater knowledge of the infant's condition than is possible before birth.

So the issue of ending life for disabled newborn infants is not without complications, which we do not have the space to discuss adequately. Nevertheless the main point is clear: killing a disabled infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person. Very often it is not wrong at all.

Imagine all the considerable advantages we could be enjoying today if we could just get around the "complications" of killing non-self-conscious children (he helpfully suggests a limit of 28 days during which you can snuff your kid without reprisal, indeed earning a congratulatory nod for your wise choice). Apparently, I just haven't given it enough thought.

Or maybe I'm not smart enough to get it. As George Orwell said, "You have to be an intellectual to believe such nonsense. No ordinary man could be such a fool."

Funny thing is, Peter Singer's analysis resonates with me, but my conclusion is completely different. He's convinced me of the exact opposite -- that killing a child at any stage is morally equivalent.

Thanks Peter Singer.

Here's a utilitarian conundrum for Peter Singer. If a person's thinking had the potential of destroying his "balance of happiness" by sending him to a place filled with pointy forks and lots of smoke and flame, in no small part as a reward for misleading all those weak-minded fools he's earned as followers (just a chance of this very warm fate, mind you, we're talking about predicting an uncertain future, as you are willing to do for the hemophiliac babies you would kill without blinking an eye), wouldn't you agree that to maximize his chances for a positive balance of happiness, that person should shut his yap? Seems to me like a sound recommendation firmly grounded in utilitarian thinking.

[I wonder how closely the thinking behind Gwynne Dyer's brush-off of the terror attacks in London (only 40 dead, after all, at the time he wrote his piece) can be linked to Peter Singer's abhorrent and dehumanizing utilitarian philosophy. Maybe the CBC could do with one less utilitarian and one more human being. There must be one somewhere in Canada who string two or three sentences together into a radio broadcast.]